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SECURITIES LAW: IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS AND
BROKER "CHURNING" HIGHLIGHT THE TERM
JOHN C. WALDEN*

In the 1983-84 term, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit contributed significantly to the field of securities law. The court decided eight securities cases during the term, involving the general areas of
implied private rights of action, fraudulent conduct in connection with
transactions in securities, beneficial ownership and liability for shortswing profits, and the definition of investment advisor under the Investment Advisors Act.
The Seventh Circuit's decisions involving implied private rights of
action under the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (1934 Act) were particularly noteworthy. In one case, 2 the court examined section 7(d) and
Regulation U, which impose reporting requirements on a bank which
accepts margin stock as security for a loan. The court found, by inquiring into the congressional intent underlying the statute, that no private
remedy existed for the borrower against the lending bank. 3 This case was
the Seventh Circuit's first review of private rights under section 7(d), and
the first circuit-level application of the Supreme Court's recently announced congressional intent analysis under section 7(d). In another
case of first impression, 4 the Seventh Circuit recognized the implied right
of a corporation to obtain injunctive relief against a purchaser of the corporation's shares for violation of section 13(d)'s disclosure provisions.
The court based its conclusion that Congress intended to create a private
right of action under section 13(d) on a unique examination of the legal
context surrounding the enactment of the provision.5
The most significant decision 6 of the 1983-84 term arose under the
anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act; section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The
Seventh Circuit held that a broker's violation of the trading parameters
of a customer's options account constituted improper "churning" under
*
of Law,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

B.S. in Finance, University of Illinois, 1982. Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College
1986.
Hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act.
Bassler v. Central National Bank in Chicago, 715 F.2d 308 (1983).
See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
Indiana National Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180 (1983).
See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 1361 (1983).
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Rule lOb-5. 7 In this decision the court announced a new, broader definition of "churning" and relaxed the evidentiary standards traditionally
employed to establish the offense.
This note will review the eight securities cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during its 1983-84 term. A brief perspective will be offered
for each case in order to place the case in the context of other related
decisions, and, where appropriate, a decision's potential impact will be
assessed.
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

The Seventh Circuit had opportunity in the 1983-84 term to decide,
under three different sections of the 1934 Act, whether to grant complainants relief when the provisions of the statute were silent as to private
remedies. Because the law of implied private actions under the securities
laws has evolved rapidly, it is helpful to briefly trace its development
prior to reviewing the cases in the Seventh Circuit.
Background
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of implied rights of
action under the 1934 Act in 1964 in JL Case Co. v. Borak.8 In Borak, a
shareholder sued the corporation for a violation of the proxy rules contained in section 14(a). 9 In holding that there was an implied right of
action, the Court found that section 14(a) had explicit language indicating a congressional purpose to protect investors from misleading proxy
statements. This purpose created a duty in favor of investors as a class,
and a breach of the duty could be actionable by the investor.
Since Borak, the Supreme Court has gradually modified its general
standard for implying private remedies. In 1974, the Court held that
7. See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
8. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Borak, the plaintiff, a shareholder of defendant J.I. Case Co., brought
a derivative suit alleging that Case distributed a misleading proxy statement which resulted in shareholder approval of a merger. Id. at 429-30. Borak sought private damages and an injunction voiding
the merger. Id. at 430.
9. Id. Section 14(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his
name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (emphasis supplied). Specifically, Borak addressed private rights under
S.E.C. Rule 14a-9, promulgated under section 14(a), which provides in pertinent part:
No solicitation. . . shall be made by means of any proxy statement. . . which at the time
and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981).

SECURITIES

where a statute's legislative history and express language refer only to
non-private remedies, no private action could be inferred.' 0 One year
later, the Court established the requirement that a private action be necessary to further the purpose of the statute." These modifications of the
criteria for implying private remedies left the lower courts confused.
This confusion was largely resolved in Cort v. Ash 12 when the Supreme
Court identified four factors to be considered in determining the existence of a private right of action: 1) whether the plaintiff was a member of
a class for whose especial benefit the legislation was enacted; 2) whether
there was any indication, explicit or implicit, of a legislative intent either
to create or deny a private remedy; 3) whether implication of a private
right was consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme; and 4) whether the cause of action was one traditionally relegated to state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a claim based
on federal law. Unfortunately, the Court did not indicate the comparative weight to be accorded each of these factors in the inquiry as to the
existence of an implied private right of action.
Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to redefine its explicit pointby-point Cort analysis by limiting its inquiry to congressional intent; the
second Cort factor. In Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc.,' 3 the Court
stated that the four factors of Cort were relevant but not determinative of
the existence of a private right of action.14 The Piper court instead
looked only to legislative history as an indication of congressional intent
to imply or deny a private action. The Piper rationale was extended in
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,15 where the Supreme Court examined
the statute's legislative history, explicit language, and purpose as indica10. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974) [Amtrak case]. Plaintiff passengers sought to enjoin the discontinuance of certain passenger trains claiming that such discontinuance violated the Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
11. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975). A brokerage
customer sought a district court order for the S.E.C. and the Security Investor Protection Corp. to
begin liquidation of a troubled brokerage firm. Id. at 414. The action was brought under the Security Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78ggg (1970).
12. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The plaintiff in Cort, a stockholder, sought private damages from the
corporation's directors for violation of a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. III
1973) (repealed 1976). The statute prohibited corporations from making campaign contributions in
certain elections. 422 U.S. at 68.
13. 430 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977). The plaintiff, Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,
attempted to gain control of the defendant Piper Aircraft Co. through a cash tender offer. ChrisCraft sought damages for Piper's alleged misleading statements under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act.
Id. at 59. Section 14(e) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact . . . in connection with any
tender offer..." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
14. Id. at 37.
15. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The issue was whether customers of a securities brokerage firm had an
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tive of congressional intent. Justice Rehnquist stated in Touche Ross that
although Cort provided four "relevant" factors to be considered in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute, each factor
should not receive equal weight.1 6 The Court's role was limited "solely
to determining whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action."' 7 Most recently, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran,'8 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Piper, giving only perfunctory
attention to the Cort analysis and instead relying wholly on legislative
construction.

'9

In 1982, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's approach
of looking to congressional intent to imply private remedies. 20 In the
1983-84 term, three cases gave the Seventh Circuit the opportunity to
employ this approach.
Borrowers Remedies Under Section 7(d)-Bassler v. Central National
Bank in Chicago
To monitor the practice of borrowing funds for the purpose of speculating in securities, the Federal Reserve Board enacted Regulation U
under authority of section 7(d) of the 1934 Act. 2' Regulation U requires
implied cause of action against the audit accountants for inaccuracies in the financial reports of the
firm. The action was brought under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act, which provides in pertinent part:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, . . . and every broker or dealer
registered pursuant to. . .this title should make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such
accounts, correspondence, . . . and other records, and make such reports, as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
16. 442 U.S. at 575.
17. Id. at 568.
18. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). In Curran, the Court consolidated four separate claims for private
relief under the Commodity Exchange Act. One claim was brought by an investor in commodity
futures contracts against his broker for violations of the anti-fraud provisions; 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1976
ed. and Supp. IV). 456 U.S. at 360. Three actions were brought by speculators in futures contracts
against the New York Mercantile Exchange, its officials, and futures commission merchants, claiming damages resulting from unlawful price manipulation that allegedly could have been prevented by
the Commodity Futures Exchange Commission's enforcement of its own rules. 456 U.S. at 369.
This action was commenced under section 4(b) of the CEA; 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).
456 U.S. at 369 n.42.
19. The Curran court conducted a unique analysis of the contemporary legal context in which
the CEA provisions were enacted, and found that Congress intended to create private rights of
action. Id. at 374-95. For a discussion of such an analysis, see infra notes 40-46 and accompanying
text.
20. See Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1982); Allison v. Liberty Savings, 695 F.2d
1086 (7th Cir. 1982).
21. Section 7(d) of the 1934 Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person. . . to extend or maintain credit or to arrange for the
extension or maintenance of credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any security,
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal

SECURITIES

banks to secure a Federal Reserve Form U-I, or Purpose Statement,
from all borrowers using margin stock as security for loans. In Bassler v.
Central National Bank in Chicago,22 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered and rejected a borrower's claim for private relief
under Regulation U and section 7(d).
The plaintiff, Bassler, had entered into a series of loan transactions
with the defendant, Central National Bank, to finance Bassler's purchase
of Rochelle Bank and Trust Company stock. Bassler executed and delivered promissory notes and pledged Rochelle stock as security for the
notes. Central failed to obtain from Bassler the Purpose Statement, required by Regulation U whenever an extension of credit is secured by
stock. When Bassler later discovered that the Rochelle stock was worthless, he claimed that Central's violation entitled him to void his loan contract. 23 The district court dismissed the action, finding that Bassler had
no private remedy under section 7(d). 24 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
25
dismissal.
The Bassler court started its analysis by declaring that in the postCort era, the question of the existence of an implied private right of action under section 7 must be answered by ascertaining congressional inReserve System shall prescribe to prevent the excessive use of credit for the purchasing or
carrying of or trading in securities in circumvention of the other provisions of this section.
15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1982). Regulation U provides in pertinent part:
In connection with an extension of credit secured directly or indirectly by any margin
stock, the bank shall obtain. . . a statement in conformity with the requirements of Federal Reserve Form U-I executed by the recipient of such extension of credit (sometimes
referred to as the "customer") and executed and accepted in good faith by a duly authorized officer of the bank prior to such extension ....
15 C.F.R. § 221.3 (1984).
22. 715 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1983).
23. Id. at 309. Bassler contended for the first time on appeal that section 7(d) should be construed in the context of the whole 1934 Act, and specifically section 29(b). Id. n.5. He urged that
section 29(b) made the loan contract voidable at his option. Id. at 309. Section 29(b) provides in
pertinent part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder. . . shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation
of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made . . . any such contract, and
(2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract shall have
acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the
making . . . of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or
regulation. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982). Bassler also alleged that Central was aware of the worthlessness of
Rochelle stock at the time of the loan, and thereunder violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and
S.E.C. Rule 10b-5, by failing to disclose the worthlessness to Bassler. 715 F.2d at 309. The district
court held that Bassler failed to allege facts from which Central's duty to disclose could be inferred.
Id. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded as to this count, finding
that Bassler's complaint was broad enough to allow proof of Central's duty. Id. (citing Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980)).
24. 715 F.2d at 309.
25. Id. at 313.
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tent. 26 In its searching for this intent, the court first examined the
purpose of section 7, and whether that purpose was to protect individual
investors such as Bassler. The court noted that section 7(d) authorizes
the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations "to prevent the excessive use of credit for the purchasing or carrying of or trading in securities."' 27 Because borrowing investors are the users of credit, it is their
conduct at which the statute is aimed. 28 Furthermore, although section
7(d) proscribes the failure of lenders to obtain Regulation U statements,
section 7(f) makes it unlawful for the individual investor to obtain credit
in a transaction in which they fail to provide the lender with a Regulation U statement. 29 The Bassler court reasoned that Congress would not
have enacted 7(f) if the purpose underlying section 7 was the protection
30
of individual investors.
An additional factor considered by the Basslercourt in searching for
congressional intent was the legislative history and statutory scheme behind section 7(d). Section 7(d) was an original provision of the 1934 Act.
The court found that the Act was passed to promote the nation's financial health and stabilize the credit markets, rather than to protect the
individual investor. 3t Although the Act may, as a byproduct, protect
individual investors, this was not its primary purpose. 32 The court there33
fore was unwilling grant a private remedy under section 7(d).
26. Id. at 310. The Bassler court stated that "of the four factors enunciated in Cort, the second-whether there is any indication of Congressional intent, explicit or implicit, to create or deny a
private remedy-is the key." Id.
27. Id. at 310-11 (emphasis added) (quoting section 7(d); 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1981)). See also
note 21 supra.
28. Id.
29. Id. Section 7(f) provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any United States person . . . to obtain, receive, or enjoy the beneficial
use of a loan or other extension of credit from any lender . . . for the purpose of
(A) purchasing or carrying United States securities, or (B) purchasing or carrying within
the United States of any other securities, if, under this section or rules and regulations
prescribed thereunder, the loan or other credit transaction is prohibited ....
15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1982).
30. 715 F.2d at 311.
31. Id. at 313 (citing House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report on H.R. 9323,
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934)).
32. 715 F.2d at 313.
33. The Bassler court additionally discussed Bassler's argument that the language of section
29(b) of the 1934 Act, which voids all contracts made in violation of the Act, see supra note 24,
conferred a private action under section 7(d). Bassler relied upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Transamerica Mortgagee Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), wherein
section 215 of the Investment Advisors Act, which has language comparable to that of section 29(b)
of the 1934 Act, was held to imply a private remedy under the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisors Act. TAMA was silent as to whether the language of section 215 alone was sufficient

to imply a right of action. The Bassler court interpreted TAMA to hold that language alone was
insufficient to create a private remedy without other independent clues of congressional intent. 715
F.2d at 312. The Bassler court found that Bassler presented no such clues with respect to section 7
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In Bassler, the Seventh Circuit conducted an examination of legislative intent to imply a private remedy, looking to the purpose of section
7(d), its language and the language of other pertinent provisions, and the
legislative history underlying the regulation's enactment. The court's inquiry was in line with recent Supreme Court decisions which focused on
34
congressional intent rather than the four factors enunciated in Cort.
Moreover, Bassler represented the Seventh Circuit's first review of private remedies under section 7, and brought the Seventh Circuit's law into
accord with that of other circuits which had considered the issue. 35
Corporation'sRight to Injunctive Relief Under Section 13(d)-Indiana
National Corp. v. Rich
Indiana National Corp. v. Rich 36 presented the Seventh Circuit with
another opportunity to apply the congressional intent analysis to implication of private relief. IndianaNationalinvolved section 13(d) of the 1934
Act, which requires any person acquiring more than five percent of a
class of registered securities of a corporation to send a disclosure statement to the issuer, the markets on which the stock is traded and the
S.E.C. 37 In Indiana National,the Seventh Circuit found an implied right
of action under section 13(d) for an issuer corporation to seek injunctive
relief from a purchaser's violation of the 13(d) disclosure provisions. 38
The plaintiff, Indiana National Corporation, was a bank holding
company engaged principally in banking through its wholly owned subsidiary, Indiana National Bank. Defendants were a group of investors
of the 1934 Act, and therefore the language of section 29(b) was insufficient to imply a private
remedy under section 7(d). Id.
34. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
35. Other circuits had considered the issue and preceded Bassler in denying section 7 relief,
however all had applied the Cort analysis. See, e.g., Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 687
F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1983) (Regulation T); Gilman v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp., 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981) (Regulation U); Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, reh'g denied, 455
U.S. 1008 (1982) (Regulation T); Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d
1073 (4th Cir. 1979) (Regulation T); Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Science v.
Bear, Steams & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977) (Regulation T).
Bassler, then, was the first review of section 7 private remedies applying the Supreme Court's new
analysis of congressional intent. It is questionable, however, whether the shift from Cort to the new
analysis has any impact on implication or denial of private remedies.
36. 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983).
37. Section 13(d) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any
equity security of a class which is registered . . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall . . . send to the issuer of the security
. . . and file with the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, a statement. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d) (1982).
38. 712 F.2d at 1185.
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who, after acquiring more than five percent of Indiana National's stock,
filed a Schedule 13D as required by section 13(d). Indiana National instituted an action alleging that the Schedule 13D contained materially
false and misleading information, in violation of section 13(d). The district court dismissed the action, finding that when explicit remedies such
as S.E.C. action are provided in a statute, and no private remedies are
39
included, Congress must have intended that no private remedies exist.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
The Seventh Circuit based its reversal on an analysis of the contemporary legal context in which section 13(d) was enacted. This analysis
was first applied by the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago4° as a means of determining congressional intent behind the enactment of a statute. It provides that where Congress acts in a statutory
context in which private remedies have already been recognized by the
courts, a presumption is created that Congress was aware of the remedies
at the time the new statute was enacted. Therefore, Congress' failure to
explicitly provide for private remedies in the statute should be construed
as an intent that they be awarded in conformity with judicial precedents.
In analyzing the legal context behind the enactment of section 13(d),
the Indiana National court examined the history of the Williams Act, of
which section 13(d) is a part. The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 in
response to the growing use of cash tender offers as a means for achieving
corporate takeovers. 4 1 The purpose of the Williams Act was to ensure
that public shareholders faced with a cash tender offer were not forced to
decide upon the offer without adequate information about the qualifications and intentions of the offering party. 42 These assurances already existed for shareholders confronted with proxy solicitations or exchange
offers; 43 two other forms of corporate takeover. The Williams Act, then,
39. Id. at 1184 (citing Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92
(N.D. Ill. 1980)).
40. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon the Supreme Court found an implied private action under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Id. at 696-99. The Court reasoned that Title IX
was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was enacted at a time when Title VI
had been construed as creating a private remedy. Id. at 694-703. The Cannon court concluded that
Congress was aware of judicial implications of private remedies under Title VI, and therefore expected Title IX to be interpreted in line with those precedents. Id. at 696-99. See also Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
41. 712 F.2d at 1183 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 430
U.S. 976 (1977)).
42. Id. (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967)).

43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, 77e (1976).
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and section 13(d) specifically, was patterned after the proxy rules contained in section 14(a) of the 1934 Act.
At the time the Williams Act was enacted, section 14(a) had already
been found to establish an implied private right of action for an issuer
corporation." The IndianaNational court concluded that Congress was
aware of the judicial precedent of awarding 14(a) private remedies when
it enacted the Williams Act. 45 Therefore, according to the Supreme
Court's Cannon analysis, silence as to remedies in 13(d) reflects legislative intent to retain a private remedy for an issuer corporation, which
46
had previously been awarded under 13(d)'s prototype, section 14(a).
The Indiana National court further supported its implication of a
section 13(d) private remedy with a finding that private enforcement was
47
necessary to make the section 13(d) disclosure requirements effective.
The S.E.C., the trading markets and the issuer corporation are the only
parties to receive the Schedule 13D when filed. 48 The S.E.C., in a brief
amicus curiae, urged that it was too overburdened with Schedule 13D
disclosures to police possible violations. Therefore, the court reasoned
that the only party with both the capability and incentive to ensure accu49
rate filings was the issuer corporation.
Indiana Nationalwas the Seventh Circuit's first review of a corporation's right to injunctive relief under section 13(d). The decision overturned two previous district court decisions 50° and brought the Seventh
Circuit's law into line with the law in all other circuits which had considered the issue. 5 ' Consistent with the recent trend,5 2 the court looked to
congressional intent as dispositive of the existence of a private remedy.
However the court departed from the traditional examination of the purpose, language and history of the statute and instead analyzed the con44. 712 F.2d at 1183 (citing Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966); General
Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 430 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969)).
45. 712 F.2d at 1183.
46. Id. In further support of its legal context analysis, the IndianaNational court noted that the
Williams Act had twice been amended, and on both occasions Congress opted to leave the issuer
corporation's private remedy intact. The Indiana National Court interpreted this silence as an affirmative intent to preserve the private right of issuer corporations under section 13(d). Id. at 1184.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 37.
49. 712 F.2d at 1184.
50. See Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
51. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971); General Aircraft Corp. v.
Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977); Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 611 F.2d
240 (8th Cir. 1979); Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1101 (1981).
52. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
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temporary legal context behind the statute's enactment. Although
unique among courts which have analyzed private actions under section
13(d), the Seventh Circuit's departure was in line with recent Supreme
Court decisions which have applied the contemporary legal context analysis in other statutory settings.
Shareholder's Right to Damages Under Rule 14a-7Haas v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc.
Prior to a vote of a corporation's shareholders, each shareholder receives proxy materials, sent by other interested shareholders and the issuer, which contain solicitations for the shareholders' votes. Rule 14a7,53 promulgated under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 54 provides that
when a shareholder tenders proxy materials to the corporation for mailing to other shareholders, the corporation must mail the materials within
a reasonable time. In Haas v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 5 the Seventh Circuit
addressed the narrow question of whether a stockholder has an implied
private action under Rule 14a-7 for the corporation's failure to timely
mail the proxy materials. The court held that such a remedy was
available.
The plaintiff Haas was a shareholder of Wieboldt Stores, Inc., and
desired to be elected to its Board of Directors. Wieboldt management
opposed Haas' election. Haas requested from Wieboldt a shareholder list
so that he could mail his proxy solicitation materials. Wieboldt refused
to provide the list, and instead opted to mail the proxy materials to the
shareholders itself, as it was entitled to do. 56 On the day that Haas delivered his materials to Wieboldt, Wieboldt changed the date for the shareholder meeting for the apparent purpose of discouraging Haas' election.
This change caused Haas' materials to be inaccurate, and enabled Wieboldt to refuse to mail them. 57 Haas sought damages under Rule 14a-7
for the expense of preparing his proxy materials.
The Haas court relied solely upon the Supreme Court's 1964 deci53. Rule 14a-7 provides in pertinent part: "Copies of any proxy statement, form of proxy or
other communication furnished by the security holder shall be mailed by the issuer to such of the
holders of record . . . as the security holder shall designate." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1984).
54. See supra note 9.
55. 725 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 72. A corporation has an option when confronted with a stockholder who desires to
solicit proxies. The corporation may either provide the solicitor with a list of all shareholders, or
mail the proxy materials itself at its own expense. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1984) (Rule 14a-7).
57. Id. A corporation may refuse to mail a shareholder's proxy materials that violate section
14(a). See Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d Cir. 1970). Haas' materials were false and misleading, in violation of Rule 14a-9, so Wieboldt could refuse to mail them.
For the pertinent text of Rule 14a-9, see supra note 9.
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sion in J.. Case Co. v. Borak.5 8 In Borak the Court declared that under
Rule 14a-9, which forbids the mailing of misleading proxy materials, a
shareholder can bring a private action against the corporation.5 9 The
Haas court reasoned that the same harm of stockholder misinformation
is caused by a corporation's mailing of misleading proxy materials as is
caused by a corporation's failure to mail proxy materials, a Rule 14a-7
violation. Therefore, because both rules have the purpose of preventing
stockholder misinformation, the court summarily announced that both
6°
rules should contain the private remedy announced in Borak.
Although the Seventh Circuit's outcome in Haas is sound, its reliance on Borak is questionable. Borak was decided under a much broader
standard for implying private remedies than the Supreme Court has since
applied. Justice Rehnquist commented in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 6 l that "in a series of cases since Borak [the Supreme Court has] adhered to a stricter standardfor implication of private causes of action,"
and that stricter standard is followed today. 62 This makes clear that the
Borak standard is no longer applicable. Accordingly, the Haas court's
analogy of the purpose of Rule 14a-7 to that of Rule 14a-9, under the
assumption that a private remedy for 14a-9 exists under Borak, is unconvincing. Rather than relying on Borak, the Haas court should have reexamined section 14(a) under the current standard; whether there is indication of legislative intent to imply or deny a private remedy. Such an
analysis, although likely to reaffirm the Borak result, would have supported the result with current law.
Aside from the issue of implying private remedies, Haas is noteworthy for the court's interpretation of Rule 14a-7. The rule provides that
"Copies of any proxy statement, form of proxy or other communication
furnished by the security holder shall be mailed by the issuer to such
holders of record . . . as the security holder shall designate."' 63 The
Haas court reasoned that although refusal to mail false materials is generally excused, it should not be excused when the corporation itself has
caused the materials to be false. 64 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, announced in Haas that a corporation's refusal to mail a shareholder's
proxy materials, which were made false by the deliberate efforts of the
58. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
59. 725 F.2d at 73. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
60. 725 F.2d at 73.
61. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). For a discussion of Touche Ross, see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
62. 442 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1984).
64. 725 F.2d at 73.
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corporation to prevent the mailing, is a prima facie violation of Rule 14a7.65

FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS UNDER SECTION

AND RULE

10(b)

lOb-5

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 66 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 67 have been frequent areas of litigation. They provide a cause of
action for plaintiffs who suffer an injury as a result of manipulation or
deception in connection with the sale of securities. During the 1983-84
term, the Seventh Circuit decided two cases under these anti-fraud
provisions.
Generous Grant of a FederalRemedyNorris v. Wirtz
Misrepresentations are actionable under section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob5 only if made "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security. In
Norris v. Wirtz, 6 8 the Seventh Circuit considered whether this requirement was satisfied where a Trustee misrepresented to a trust beneficiary
the market value of securities held in the trust. Because the misrepresentations were made in securing the beneficiary's necessary approval for the
sale of the securities, they satisfied the "in connection with" requirement.
The plaintiff, Susan Norris, was the beneficiary of her father's testamentary trust. William Wirtz was trustee, and William Wirtz's father,
Arthur Wirtz, was named as successor trustee. The trust property in65. Id. The Haas court discussed this issue in the context of an argument that Haas' complaint
stated no cause of action upon which relief could be granted. This issue was separate from the
question of implied private remedies, but the court chose to discuss both arguments due to confusion
in the district court's basis for judgment. Id. at 71.
66. Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... [to] use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
67. Rule lOb-5 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
68. 719 F.2d 256 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1713 (1984).
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cluded the minority stock interest in three closely-held companies: St.
Louis Arena Corporation; Arena Bowl, Inc.; and Judge & Dolph, Ltd.
William Wirtz was President and Director and Arthur Wirtz was Chairman of the Board of Directors of each of the three companies. The controlling shareholder in each of the companies was the Wirtz Corporation,
which was owned by William and Arthur Wirtz.
The terms of the trust granted the trustee full power to sell, exchange or pledge any or all of the trust property as he deemed proper. 69
The trust further allowed the "individual Trustee" to purchase any securities held in the trust, provided that he have the prior approval of
Susan Norris. 70 The Wirtzes secured Susan Norris' written approval for
the St. Louis Arena Corporation and Arena Bowl, Inc. to redeem their
shares of stock which were held in the trust. The Wirtzes also received
Norris' approval for the Wirtz Corporation to purchase the shares of
Judge & Dolph, Ltd. from the trust. Neither purchase was to be made
by the individual trustee William Wirtz. These transactions were routinely approved by the probate court, and when executed effectively
brought the three companies under the sole control of William and Arthur Wirtz.
Susan Norris alleged that the Wirtzes and their associated companies made misrepresentations to her regarding the fair price of the shares
sold from the trust, thereby fraudulently securing her approval of the
transactions in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 71 The district
court dismissed the claim, holding that the trust gave Susan Norris no
authority to prevent the sale of shares to the corporations themselves,
only to William Wirtz individually, and therefore the alleged misrepresentations were not made "in connection with" the sale of securities as
required by Rule lOb-5. 72 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling.
The Seventh Circuit first discussed the threshold issue of Norris'
standing to bring her action. The only private plaintiffs who may bring a
cause of action under section 10(b) are those who actually buy or sell a
69. "The will establishing the trust states: 'The Trustee shall have full power to ... sell, exchange or pledge any or all of the trust property as he deems proper. . for such purposes as the
Trustee deems advisable. . . . [T]he decision and judgment of my said Trustee shall be conclusive,
binding and final and no present or future income beneficiary shall question the decision or good
faith of such Trustee.' " 719 F.2d 256, 261 (1983) (Bauer, J., dissenting).
70. "The will states: 'Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the individual
Trustee. . . from becoming a purchaser of any such securities from any available source whatsoever
provided he has the approval of the income benficiaries . . . with respect to such purchase.' " Id.
71. Id. at 258. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are provided supra notes 66-67.
72. The district court below concluded that the Wirtz's misrepresentations were breaches of
fiduciary duties, cognizable only under state law rather than federal law. Id.
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security. 73 This requirement is known as the Birnbaum rule. 74 This rule
has been relaxed in a number of recent cases which have held that a party
who feels the direct impact of a transaction need not actually perform the
mechanics of the transaction in order to have standing under section
10(b). 75 Susan Norris, as beneficiary, felt the direct impact of William
76
Wirtz's transactions, and she therefore had standing to bring a claim.
The central issue in Norris was whether Susan Norris had authority
under the trust to prevent the purchase of stock by the three corporations
controlled by William and Arthur Wirtz. If Norris had no such authority, then the alleged misrepresentations had no impact on William
Wirtz's power to sell the shares. The misrepresentations, then, would
not have been made in connection with the sale of securities, and would
77
not, therefore, have been actionable under Rule lOb-5.
The will provided that Susan Norris must approve only purchases of
stock made by the "individual Trustee." The Norris court summarily
held that this provision applied to any self-dealing transaction, including
the purchases made by the closely-held corporations under the control of
William and Arthur Wirtz. 78 Therefore, Susan Norris had the power to
refuse the transactions and the "in connection with" requirement of Rule
lOb-5 was satisfied. The court continued that only such a realistic interpretation of the alleged conduct could further the broad proscription
79
against fraud under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Judge Bauer dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the
trust agreement gave Susan Norris no power to control the purchase of
stock by the three closely-held corporations.80 Accordingly, he con73. Id. at 259.
74. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). The Birnbaum rule was approved by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975). See also note 82 infra.
75. See Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909
(1979) (the beneficiaries of a pension trust have standing to sue the pension fund trustees for securities frauds); James v. Gerber Products Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) (the term "purchaserseller" should be interpreted flexibly in order to protect the investing public and ensure honest securities dealings); Mallis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 431
U.S. 928 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 31 (1978) (per curiam) (pledgees of stock certificates have
standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5). See also O'Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979) (trustees of a pension fund whose assets were
managed by a bank may have had standing as purchasers to sue the bank for its violations of section
10(b)).
76. 719 F.2d at 259.
77. Id. at 259-60.
78. "We think that the only reasonable interpretation of the testamentary provision is that it
was intended to prevent any self-dealing transaction, regardless of the form, in which the individual
trustee purchased securities beneficially owned by the plaintiff." Id. at 260.
79. Id. at 261 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983)).
80. Id. at 261-62 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
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cluded that the alleged misrepresentations were not made in connection
with the sale or purchase of securities, and were not violative of section
10(b) or Rule lOb-5. Furthermore, Judge Bauer urged that Norris
presented an issue of pure state trust law, which is not contemplated by
federal securities laws.
The Norris majority emphasized the substance of the Wirtz' selfdealing transactions over their form in interpreting the trust agreement
to find a violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The court's interpretation was reasonable, and appears just in affording Susan Norris relief.
However, the award of a federal remedy seems inconsistent with the recent Supreme Court trend of limiting relief under 1Ob-5. 8 ' In the past
decade, the Supreme Court has limited the class of plaintiffs allowed to
recover under lOb-5, 8 2 invoked a scienter requirement as an element of
the cause of action,8 3 and found that allegations of fraud are insufficient
without specific allegations of misrepresentation or deception.8 4 In the
most recent of these decisions, the Court expressly stated that section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should not be invoked to remedy a breach of state
fiduciary duty.8 5 Given the express language of the Norris trust, the
Norris court could easily have found that the Wirtz misrepresentations
were not made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and
81. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884
(1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
82. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884
(1975). The offerees of a stock offering sued the offering corporation, Blue Chip, under section 10(b)
for "intentionally [making] the prospectus overly pessimistic in order to discourage [offerees] from
accepting what was intended to be a bargain offer, so that the rejected shares might later be offered to
the public at a higher price." The Blue Chip Court denied recovery by limiting the class of 10(b)
plaintiffs to actual purchasers and sellers. The Court's rationale was based on a desire to avoid
vexatious litigation arising as a result of the settlement value of specious claims and the potential for
abuse of discovery proceedings. Id. at 739.
83. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). The
plaintiff investors alleged that the defendant accounting firm, Ernst & Ernst, was negligent in the
preparation of certain reports prepared for the S.E.C., and had the reports been properly prepared,
the S.E.C. would have been alerted of a fraudulent investment scheme which resulted in plaintiffs
harm. The Court found that Congress intended that a higher standard than negligence be required
to create 10(b) liability, and that scienter on the part of Ernst & Ernst must be established. Plaintiffs
failed to establish scienter and liability was denied. Id.
84. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977). The defendant Delaware
corporation used a short-form merger to buy all of the minority stock of one of its subsidiaries.
Rather than exercise their appraisal rights under the Delaware statute, the plaintiff minority shareholders brought a Rule lOb-5 action. The plaintiffs alleged that the parent corporation knowingly
used a fraudulent appraisal as the basis of its offer, but plaintiffs failed to allege either misrepresentation or deception in the corporation's notice of purchase. The Court found that both the language
and legislative history of section 10(b) mandated that misrepresentation or deception be proven in
the cause of action. The plaintiffs failed in this proof and their recovery was denied. Id. at 477.
85. Id. (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 41, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976
(1977)).
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left Susan Norris to seek her remedy in the state courts for what was
clearly a breach of her trustee's fiduciary duty. Instead, the Seventh Circuit held inconsistently with the Supreme Court trend, demonstrating an
amenability to award a federal remedy.
Another interesting aspect of the Norris decision is the Seventh Circuit's expansion of the section 10(b) standing requirement. As noted by
the Norris majority, the Supreme Court established the Birnbaum rule
which limited the class of plaintiffs allowed standing under section 10(b)
to those who actually purchase or sell a security. 86 The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Sixth Circuits have interpreted the rule to further allow standing to those directly impacted or benefited by the
transaction. s7 Prior to Norris v. Wirtz, the Seventh Circuit had not ruled
upon this expansion of the class of 10(b) plaintiffs. In Norris, the Seventh
Circuit joined the Second and Sixth Circuits, finding that a trust beneficiary who feels the direct impact of a transaction has standing under section 10(b).
Churning Under Rule lOb-S-Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.
In Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,88 the Seventh Circuit addressed a customer's allegations of misrepresentation and churning by a
brokerage firm in its handling of the customer's options and arbitrage
trading accounts.
In September, 1976, the plaintiff Costello opened an options trading
account with the defendant Oppenheimer, to be managed by Oppenheimer's employee Ronald Brownlow. Costello gave Brownlow instructions which specified Brownlow's allowable trading parameters, and
emphasized that Costello wanted the principal of his new account absolutely protected. During two periods while Brownlow was absent from
his office, 8 9 Brownlow's partner, Piet, executed transactions in Costello's
account which violated Costello's trading parameters. 90 Costello complained on both occasions, and Brownlow twice assured him that the
nonconforming trades would be remedied.
After having protested the handling of his account to Brownlow for
86. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.

87. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
88. 711 F.2d 1361 (1983).
89. Id. at 1364-65. Brownlow was away from the office between March 25 and April 10, 1977,
and again between June 25 and July 5, 1977.
90. Id. at 1365. Although Piet was Brownlow's partner, Brownlow had primary responsibility
for Costello's account except on the two occasions when Brownlow was away. Brownlow terminated his partnership with Piet immediately upon Brownlow's return from his second vacation, on
July 5, 1977.
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several months, 91 Costello met with O'Donnell, an Oppenheimer Vice
President and Branch Manager, in December 1977. O'Donnell acknowledged the mishandling of Costello's account, but convinced Costello to
transfer his funds into an arbitrage account with promises that such an
account would yield higher returns. Costello became dissatisfied as Oppenheimer turned his account over to a series of different account executives, and in September, 1978, he closed his account with Oppenheimer.
Costello was shocked to learn that the value of his account had dropped
from the $275,906 market value quoted by Oppenheimer on December
31, 1977, to an actual market value of $166,780 upon the account's
92
closing.
Costello commenced action for damages under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, and Rule lOb-5. 9 3 His first count alleged that Oppenheimer
made material misrepresentations of the market value of his arbitrage
account. 94 Costello also alleged that Oppenheimer had "churned" his
options account by engaging in excessive trading for the purpose of generating commissions. 9 5 The district court found that misrepresentations
did occur in connection with the arbitrage account between January and
April, 1978, and that the options account was churned between March
and July, 1977. Costello was awarded damages reflecting only the decreases in the accounts' market values during the periods of misrepresentation and churning plus commissions charged during the churning
period. Oppenheimer appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
finding of churning, reversed the finding of misrepresentation, and re91. Id. From July to November, 1977, there was little activity in Costello's account. Brownlow was trading defensively in an effort to reduce the losses that were occurring due to Piet's transactions. On November 19, 1977, Brownlow wrote a letter to O'Donnell, explaining why he had kept
Costello's and other accounts relatively inactive. The reason, he explained, was that Piet had anticipated these accounts closing due to trading losses, so Piet "churned" the accounts to generate commissions. Brownlow voiced disagreement with Piet's practice, and on December 2, 1977 Brownlow's
employment with Oppenheimer was terminated. Id. at 1365.
92. Costello had received the following market value quotations from Oppenheimer:
$235,384.65
$253,000.00
$234,196.65
$222,710.00
$275,906.25
$180,000.00
$160,780.95

as
as
as
as
as
as
as

of
of
of
of
of
of
of

9-7-76 (opening balance)
7-22-77
10-31-77
11-18-77
12-31-77
7-12-78 (when Costello notified O'Donnell of his withdrawal)
9-15-78 (closing balance)

Id. at 1372 n.20.
93. Id. at 1367. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are provided supra notes 66-67.
94. Id. at 1371. Specifically, Costello alleged that the $275,906.25 value given to him by Oppenheimer in March, 1978, representing the December 31, 1977 market value, was misrepresented.
95. Costello alleged churning by Pite during the two periods Brownlow was away from his
office, in March and July, 1977. See supra note 89-90 and accompanying text.
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duced the award of damages to reflect only commissions paid during the
period of churning.
The Seventh Circuit focused on the issue of churning. The court
stated that the term "churning" in the context of securities regulation
denotes a course of excessive trading through which a broker places his
interest in generating commissions over the interests of his customer.
Two elements must be proven in order to establish churning: 1) that the
broker exercised control over the transactions in the account; and 2) that
the amount of trading was excessive. Churning, if proven, is a per se
violation of section 10(b) and Rule

lOb-5.

96

The Costello court had no trouble finding that Oppenheimer had
control over the trades. Costello's account was discretionary, and Costello executed a power of attorney in favor of Oppenheimer granting Oppenheimer authority to make investment decisions without Costello's
prior approval. Oppenheimer did in fact make such investment decisions, thereby exercising control over the transactions. 97
The excessive trading element of churning requires that the volume
of transactions be so excessive as to indicate that the broker intended to
derive a profit for himself at the expense of his customer. The customer's
investment objectives provide a standard against which to measure trading volume. The Costello court noted that Costello and Brownlow
agreed on specific trading parameters within which all trades should have
been executed. Furthermore, Costello repeatedly emphasized his objective to preserve the principal in the account. The Costello court found
that Costello's investment objectives were "not unduly ambitious." 98
Against Costello's investment objectives, the Costello court evaluated the volume of trades and amount of commissions. The court noted
that Costello presented none of the traditional statistical or evidentiary
measures of excessive activity. Among those traditionally used are the
ratio of trades to commissions, "in and out" trading, 99 "cross trading", to0 "turnover rate",10 1 timing and quality valuations, and expert testimony. Without the benefit of these tools, the Costello court looked to
Piet's knowing violations of the trading parameters which Brownlow and
96. Id. at 1367-68.
97. Id. at 1368.
98. Id.
99. In and out trading refers to the partial or entire sale of the customer's portfolio, replacement with new securities, and sale of the newly acquired securities within a relatively short time
period. See id. at 1369 n.9.

100. Cross trading is the broker's transferring of stock between customers. See id. n. 10.
101. Turnover rate is the ratio of the total cost of purchases made for the account during a given
period of time to the amount invested. See id. n. 11.
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Costello had agreed upon. The court also considered Brownlow's testimony of Piet's churning, and evidence that Oppenheimer executives admitted that the account was mishandled. The court held that these facts
were sufficient to support a jury finding of excessive activity. 0 2
The final issue discussed by the Costello court was damages. The
court noted that two harms are suffered by victims of churning; realized
losses due to unsuitable trades, and commissions charged for churned
trades. Costello presented no evidence of realized losses, but instead attempted, and failed, to prove market value losses.' 0 3 Therefore, the court
could find no rational basis for awarding realized loss damages based on
churning. The court awarded only losses based on commissions charged
during the churning period.
In Costello, the Seventh Circuit made a significant departure from
precedent by expanding the definition of the excessive trading element of
churning. Churning has traditionally been characterized as a "unified
offense": an offense not limited to any specific transaction or transactions. Rather, the essence of churning has been a broker's entire course
of conduct and the aggregation of transactions. 1°4 In Costello, the Seventh Circuit held that nonconforming options trades constituted excessive activity. Under Costello, then, excessive activity can be established
simply by a showing that specific trades violated the customer's trading
parameters, without reference to the volume or pattern of activity.
In expanding the churning offense to include individual trading parameter violations, the Seventh Circuit left many questions unanswered.
The traditional churning offense, a per se violation of section 10(b), requires that the volume of transactions be so excessive as to indicate a
broker's placing his interest in generating commissions over the interest
of his customer. The volume of transactions indicates fraud, irrespective
102. Id. at 1369-70. After finding that churning did occur, the Costello court examined at
length, and rejected, Costello's allegations of misrepresentation. Because Costello presented no
proof of the actual market value of his arbitrage account as of December 31, 1977, the court could
not find that Oppenheimer's $275,906 value was misrepresented. Id. at 1370-72. The court's
lengthy analysis of market values was unnecessary to dispose of Costello's misrepresentation claim.
See O'Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979) (where pension fund
manager had full discretion to manage the stocks in the fund, the manager's misrepresentations to
the fund trustees were not made "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities).
103. 711 F.2d at 1374. Realized losses differ from market value losses in that a loss is not "realized" until a sale is made, because until sale a security can regain and exceed its original value
thereby wiping out any loss. Id. This approach to awarding only realized loss damages has been
criticized when applied to stock options, which have characteristics different from ordinary common
stock. See generally Note, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 Bus.
LAW. 571 (1984).
104. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th cir. 1970).
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of whether the transactions conform to customer guidelines. However,
the Costello court seemed to base its finding of churning not on the volume of trades, but rather on individual violations of customer-established
trading parameters. It is unclear under Costello whether excessive trading is still an element of churning. If not, the offense is not really churning at all, but rather breach of contract. Such an offense would not likely
be presumed fraudulent, as is churning, but would have to satisfy the
literal requirements of section 10(b) in order to be actionable.
Another question unanswered in Costello is the applicability of the
relaxed evidentiary standard. The Costello court recognized that its expansion of the definition of "excessive activity" to include parameter violations made some of the traditional evidentiary prerequisites to proof of
churning unnecessary. No longer was there a need for statistical evidence or expert testimony, which has historically been used to show excessive trade volume or commissions. A factual showing that the
customer's parameters were violated was sufficient. However, the court
was silent as to whether the evidentiary standards should be relaxed in all
churning cases, or only where the offense was based on nonconforming
trades.
Finally, the recognition that churning can be established based upon
individual trades has important implications for damages. The Costello
court awarded commission damages for the entire period of churning,
irrespective of individual transactions. Yet in discussing damages for
realized losses, the court looked for identification of the specific wrongful
trades and traces of their financial consequences.' 0 5 This inconsistency
highlights the confusion in the area of churning, and raises a question
whether a plaintiffs claim of single parameter violations also places on
the plaintiff the cumbersome burden of isolating every unsuitable transaction in order to recover damages.
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP UNDER SECTION

16(b)-Colan v.

Monumental Corp.
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act 0 6 was enacted for the purpose of
preventing corporate insiders from deriving short-swing profits from the
purchase or sale of their corporation's stock on the basis of information
not available to others. Besides corporate officers and directors, the class
105. 711 F.2d at 1375 ("unlike the usual case in which churning is a unified offense established
not on evidence of individual transactions but by proof that an overall course of trading has, in the
aggregate, been excessive ... it would have been possible [for Costello] to have identified the wrongful trades and to have traced their financial consequences.")
106. See infra note 110.
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of insiders under 16(b) includes beneficial owners of more than 10% of a
corporation's common stock. These insiders must disgorge profits made
on their sale and purchase of any shares of the stock within any period of
six months. In Colan v. Monumental Corp.,107 the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether an owner of an option to buy stock is
considered a beneficial owner under section 16(b), and thereby exposed
to absolute liability for short-swing profits.
On November 14, 1978, defendant Kaufman and Broad, Inc. (K &
B) owned 4.92% of Monumental Corporation's outstanding common
stock. Two days later, K & B acquired an option to purchase another
5.15% of Monumental stock from Salomon Brothers, and a similar option to purchase 6.76% of Monumental's stock from Goldman Sachs &
Co. K & B exercised the Salomon option on March 13, 1979, which
brought its ownership of Monumental common stock to 10.06%. To
evade any potential liability for short-swing profits that could arise under
section 16(b), K & B sold 4000 shares of Monumental on April 24, 1979,
decreasing K & B's ownership to 9.98%. On May 15, 1979, K & B entered into an agreement with Monumental under which Monumental
could purchase all of K & B's holdings of Monumental stock, including
the stock to be acquired through exercise of the Goldman option. The
following day, K & B exercised the Goldman option.
David Colan, a Monumental shareholder, brought a derivative suit
to recover short-swing profits allegedly made by K & B in violation of
section 16(b). The district court granted K & B's motion for summary
judgment, and Colan appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
On appeal, Colan argued that K & B's ownership of Monumental
options made K & B a beneficial owner, for purposes of section 16(b), of
the underlying Monumental stock. Colan relied on Rule 16a-2(b),10
promulgated under section 16(a) 109 of the 1934 Act, which provides that
107. 713 F.2d 330 (1983).
108. Rule 16a-2b provides in pertinent part:
In determining for the purpose of section 16(a) of the Act whether a person is the beneficial
owner. . . of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities, such person shall be
deemed to be the beneficial owner of securities of such class which such person has a right
to acquire through the exercise of presently exercisable options, warrants or rights.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1984).
109. Section 16(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per
centum of any class of any equity security . . . or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file. . . a statement with the [Securities and Exchange] Commission . . . of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
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presently exercisable stock options are to be considered in the class of
securities which compromise beneficial ownership under section 16(a).
Section 16(b) is silent as to stock options, but refers to the definition of
beneficial ownership in section 16(a) with the phrase "such beneficial
owner." 11 0 Colan contended that because section 16(b) refers to section
16(a) in defining beneficial owner, the Rule 16a-2(b) beneficial owner definition is applicable to section 16(b).1 1 I This reasoning would make K &
B a beneficial owner by virtue of its stock options, and K & B would be
subject to liability during its period of beneficial ownership.
The court rejected Colan's argument, relying on a release by the
Securities and Exchange Commission" 2 which stated that beneficial
ownership under 16(a) does not necessarily create liability under 16(b).
The court reasoned that beneficial ownership under section 16(a) should
be construed broadly, because section 16(a) merely places a filing requirement on beneficial owners. In contrast, section 16(b) places absolute liability on beneficial owners for short-swing profits, and should therefore
be interpreted more narrowly. Given the difference in the scopes of sections 16(a) and 16(b), the Colan court refused to find liability under 16(b)
13
for individuals falling within the broad ambit of section 16(a).'
110. Section 16(b) provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained
by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer. . . within any period of less than six months. . . shall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner. . . . This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of
the security involved.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
111. 713 F.2d at 332-33. This argument has been raised in other cases. See, e.g., Whittaker v.
Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.) (viewing section 16(a) and section 16(b) as cohesive unit
but rejecting presumption of equivalence), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); Whiting v. Dow
Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975) (two sections should be read together to give effect to
legislative intent); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963) (section 16(b) must be
read in conjunction with section 16(a) to determine whether director liable under section 16(b)),
affid, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (reporting provisions of section 16(a) only slightly significant in deciding section
16(b) liability).
112. The SEC release provided in pertinent part:
The fact that ownership of securities and transactions in those securities are reported under
Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not necessarily mean that liability will result therefrom under Section 16(b). The question whether liabilities under Section 16(b) will arise from the transactions is, of course, to be determined by the facts of
each particular case in an appropriate action brought by the issuer or its security holders.
Release No. 34-7824 (1960), 17 C.F.R. § 241.7824 (1983). This release was issued to clarify a portion of an earlier release, which stated that "[p]ersons required to file reports under Section 16(a) are
also subject to Section 16(b) . . . of the Act." Release No. 34-7793 (1966), 17 C.F.R. § 241.7793

(1983).
113. 713 F.2d at 333 ("While it is true that the subsections are grammatically linked, and that
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Having rejected Colan's Rule 16a-2(b) argument, the Colan court
proceeded to a subjective test of whether stock options should be included in the 16(b) definition of beneficial ownership. 1 4 The court noted
that the purpose of section 16(b) was to curb speculative abuse by those
with access to inside information. 1 5 The Colan court reasoned that
ownership of an unexercised option to acquire stock at some future time
does not confer to the owner any of the benefits or rights of stock ownership. Therefore, option ownership provides no inside information, and
no opportunity for abuse. The Colan court held that unexercised stock
options, such as those held by K & B, were not to be included in the class
of equity securities which determined beneficial ownership under section
16(b).

116

Applying section 16(b) only to K & B's ownership of Monumental
common stock, the Colan court found K & B not liable for short-swing
profits. The court noted that K & B could only be liable under section
16(b) if it both purchased and sold Monumental stock within six months
while it was a beneficial owner of more than 10% of the stock. 1 7 K & B
became a beneficial owner on March 13, 1979, after it exercised the Salomon option. It subsequently sold 4000 Monumental shares. This sale
was a 16(b) sale, but it brought K & B's ownership below 10%. K & B
made no purchase while a beneficial owner to match with the sale. Accordingly, there was no liability under Section 16(b).
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Colan was in accord with Supreme
Court precedent. Although the Supreme Court has never specifically adthere is a strong relationship between the definition of beneficial owner in 16(a) and the definition in
16(b), this does not mean that we must blindly apply 16(b) to every person who falls within the
ambit of 16(a).").
114. Most courts apply such a subjective test. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232
(1976); Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981);
Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western
Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Whiting
v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975); Mouldings, Inc. v. Potter, 465 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max
Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259
F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Altamil Corp. v. Pryor, 405 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975); Schur
v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Col, 346 F. Supp.
1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd, 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
115. 713 F.2d at 333 (citing Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972);
Portnoy v. Revlon, 650 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1981); Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981)).
116. Id. at 333-34.
117. Id. at 334. Section 16(b) expressly provides for this. See supra note 110.
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dressed the applicability of rules promulgated under section 16(a) to sec11 8
tion 16(b), the Court has, on four occasions, interpreted section 16(b).
In each case, the Court ruled in favor of the insider. In the most recent
of these cases, Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 1 9 the
Court stated that "[i]t is inappropriate to reach the harsh result of imposing [section] 16(b)'s liability without fault on the basis of unclear language."' 20 The Court continued that if Congress wished to impose such
liability, it must do so expressly or by unmistakable inference. 121 The
Seventh Circuit correctly construed section 16(b) narrowly, holding that
the broad disclosure requirements of section 16(a) should not impose absolute liability under section 16(b).
The Colan court also adhered to precedent in its application of a
subjective test to determine whether stock options are securities for purposes of section 16(b) beneficial ownership. This subjective, or pragmatic, approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Corp. 122 The Kern County Court reasoned that
all section 16(b) purchases and sales are not simply exchanges of cash for
common stock, but many transactions, including those involving stock
options, are unorthodox. 12 3 The Court held that in such a case, the
proper inquiry is "whether the transaction may serve as a vehicle for the
evil which Congress sought to prevent-the realization of short-swing
profits based upon access to inside information."1 24 The Seventh Circuit
118. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); Reliance
Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
119. 423 U.S. 232 (1976). In Foremost-McKesson, Provident Securities sold convertible debentures to Foremost which were convertible into more than 10% of Provident's outstanding common
stock. Foremost sold a debenture which brought its holdings of Provident stock to less than 10% if
converted, and Provident claimed under section 16(b) to recover Foremost's short-swing profits.
The Court examined the legislative history and intent behind section 16(b), noted that the 16(b)
absolute liability provisions should be narrowly construed, and held that no liability should be imposed on Foremost unless it owned more than 10% of Provident before Foremost's subsequent
purchase and sale. The Court found Foremost not liable. Id at 249-52.
120. Id. at 252.
121. Id.
122. 411 U.S. 582 (1973). In Kern County, Occidental Petroleum acquired more than 10% of
Kern's common stock through a tender offer. Kern defensively merged with Tenneco, and Kern's
shares were to be exchanged for Tenneco's stock one-for-one. Less than one month after its initial
tender offer, Occidental negotiated a binding option to sell its holdings to Tenneco at a date over six
months after the tender offer expired. The sale took place, and Kern sought to recover Occidental's
profits under section 16(b). The Court ruled that although Occidental's option agreement was binding and voluntarily entered into, its sale of Kern County stock was forced by the merger. Because of
the involuntary nature of the sale, and the fact that Occidental's Kern County holdings were not a
source of potential insider abuse, Occidental was not liable under section 16(b) to disgorge profits.
Id. at 600.
123. Id. at 593-94.
124. Id. at 594.
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properly applied the Kern County subjective test in Colan to find that
ownership of unexercised stock options presented no opportunity for insider abuse.
DEFINITIONS OF INVESTMENT ADVISOR

An investment advisor, as provided in section 202(a)(1 1) of the Investment Advisors Act, is any person who, for compensation, engages in
the business of advising others about the value of securities, or the advisability of transacting in securities, or who issues reports concerning securities for compensation and as part of a regular business. 125 In two

decisions, the Seventh Circuit applied this definition. In Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Suter, 1 2 6 the court upheld an injunction issued
by the district court against the defendant Suter on the grounds that
Suter was an investment advisor, and therefore subject to the anti-fraud
proscriptions of section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act. In contrast,
in Wang v. Gordon, t 27 the provisions of the Investment Advisors Act
were held inapplicable to a real estate partnership's general partner who
was not found to be an investment advisor.
The defendant in Suter published an investment newsletter through
his sole proprietorship, The National Publishing Company. The "National Portfolio Reporter" was Suter's newsletter which contained his
strategy for investing in the stock market and his specific buy and sell
recommendations. When Suter began including advice about commodities in the newsletter he changed its name to the "Profit Reporter." Subscribers to the newsletter were obtained through monthly mass mailings,
which extolled Suter's investment success, his educational background,
testimonials of satisfied customers, and guarantees of refunds to unsatisfied customers.
The S.E.C. brought an action to enjoin Suter from publishing the
promotional mass mailings. At the preliminary injunction hearing, the
district court found that Suter's advertisements made blatantly false representations, that Suter systematically cheated his subscribers and that
125. The definition of Investment Advisor is contained in section 202(a)(l 1) of the Investment
Advisors Act, which provides in pertinent part:
"Investment advisor" means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (1982).
126. 732 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1984).
127. 715 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Suter made unregistered offerings of securities.1 28 These activities were
found to violate, among other regulations, 129 section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act. 130 Suter appealed the district court's finding of a
section 206 violation, claiming that he was not an investment advisor as
defined in section 202(a)( 1)131 and was therefore not subject to the proscriptions of the Investment Advisors Act. The Seventh Circuit upheld
the district court's injunction.
Suter argued that he was not an investment advisor because section
202(a)(11)(D) 132 of the Investment Advisors Act excludes the publisher
of any "bona fide newspaper" from the definition of investment advisor.
The Suter court cited Securitiesand Exchange Commission v. Wall Street
TranscriptCorp.,133 where the Second Circuit announced that the nature
of the publication rather than the formal indicia of a newspaper should
be examined in applying the bona fide newspaper exception. 134 This subjective approach was adopted and codified by the S.E.C., which stated
that the bona fide newspaper exception should apply only where the publication is not primarily a vehicle for distributing investment advice. 135
In Suter, the court found that while Suter's publications had some of the
purely formal indicia of a newspaper, their content consisted of investment advice about the stock market, particular buy and sell recommendations and reports on investments. Moreover, these newsletters were
advertised as investment advice, Suter referred to himself as a investment
advisor, and the readership was drawn from investors. The Suter court
easily found that Suter's publications were primarily for investment advice, and therefore not subject to the bona fide newspaper exception to
128. 732 F.2d at 1297. The district court issued an injunction requiring Suter to maintain proper
records, to make an accounting regarding funds received from the sale of securities, and to provide
the SEC with copies of all of his future investment advisory publications. Id. at 1298.
129. The district court found that Suter violated the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77g (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1976). 732 F.2d at 1298.
130. For pertinent text of section 206, see infra note 138.
131. For pertinent text of section 202(a)( 11), see supra note 125. Suter additionally claimed that
his publication was protected by the First Amendment, that the district court erred in its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and the conditions of the Preliminary Injunction, and that the previous SEC
administrative action to revoke Suter's investment advisor registration and the district court's receipt
of evidence from the SEC proceeding violated Suter's constitutional rights. 732 F.2d at 1296.
132. The definition of investment advisor does not include "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation". 15
U.S.C. § 80-2(a)(11)(D) (1976).
133. 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
134. "The determination of whether or not a given publication fits within this exclusion must
depend upon the nature of its practices rather than upon the formal 'indicia of a newspaper' which it
exhibits on its face and in the size and nature of its subscription list." 732 F.2d at 1298 (quoting
Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d at 1377).
135. 732 F.2d at 1299 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 276 (1977)).
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the definition of investment advisor. 1 36 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's injunction against Suter.
In the second case, Wang v. Gordon, 137 the plaintiff Wang was a
limited partner in the Briarbrook Building Partners, a partnership
formed in 1973 to own and operate a high-rise apartment building. The
limited partnership agreement was amended in 1976 to name the defendant Gordon as general partner. The amended agreement further provided that Gordon would receive a brokerage commission on sales of
partnership property. Gordon contracted with Inland Real Estate Corporation in 1981 for the sale of the apartment building and accordingly
received a commission. Wang brought suit for damages under section
206 of the Investment Advisors Act alleging that Gordon defrauded the
limited partners in arranging the sale.' 38 Wang further alleged that
under section 215 of the Act he was entitled to rescission of the partnership agreement and restitution of his pro rata share of the brokerage
commission paid to Gordon. 139 The district court dismissed the action,
holding that because Gordon was not an investment advisor under section 202(a)(1 1) of the 1934 Act, 140 there could be no liability under either
section 206 or section 215. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal
and adopted the district court opinion as its own.
4
The district court based its decision on the case of Zinn v. Parrish,' 1
where the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the plain language of section
202(a)( 11) of the Investment Advisors Act, held that an individual who
does not "engage in the business" of giving investment advice is not an
investment advisor. Wang alleged that Gordon issued investment advice
to the limited partners through a letter which outlined the terms of the
sale agreement and discussed the transfer of some securities. However,
Wang made no allegation that Gordon issued investment advice as part
of his regular business, as required by section 202(a)(1 1). Further,
Gordon was not compensated for the information regarding securities in
136. Id. at 1299.
137. 715 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983).
138. Section 206 provides in pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any investment advisor ... to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (1982).
139. Section 215 provides in pertinent part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and every contract
heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the
continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of any provision or this subchapter,
or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1982).
140. See supra note 125.
141. 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981).
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the letter, but only received a brokerage commission for selling the building. Section 202(a)( 11) limits the definition of investment advisor to
those who are compensated for information on securities. Moreover, the
district court noted that Gordon had exclusive authority to sell the building. The court reasoned that the information in the letter outlining the
terms of the sale could not be considered "investment advice" because
Wang had no input regarding the sale. Because Gordon neither engaged
in the business of giving investment advice, received compensation for his
advice, nor even gave investment advice, Gordon was not an investment
advisor. 142
CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit decided eight securities cases during the 198384 term. The results of these decisions were mixed when compared to
the law of the Supreme Court and other courts. In the area of implied
private remedies, the court decided three cases; Bassler v. Central NationalBank in Chicago, IndianaNational Corp. v. Rich, and Haas v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc. In these decisions the court denied private rights of
action under section 7(d), and announced private remedies under sections 13(d) and 14(a). The Seventh Circuit analyzed these cases in line
with Supreme Court precedent, and decided in accord with the decisions
of other circuits.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held against the trend in its section
10(b) anti-fraud decisions. In Norris v. Wirtz, the court displayed a distaste for self-dealing, and made a strained interpretation of a trust agreement to allow a plaintiff recovery. This decision contradicted recent
Supreme Court decisions which limited recovery under section 10(b). In
Costello v. Oppenheimer, the Seventh Circuit made its most significant
departure from precedent by redefining broker churning. Other circuits
had required statistical evidence or expert testimony in order to establish
the excessive activity element of churning. However in Costello, the Seventh Circuit announced that such evidence is unnecessary. Excessive activity may now be established by a showing that a customer's trading
parameters were violated. This decision may greatly broaden the
number of plaintiffs who can recover for churning, and it also raises important questions about the need to isolate damages caused by each nonconforming trade.
142. The court refused to strain the investment advisor definition, noting that "the definitional
requirements of the statute must be interpreted so as not to sweep in persons whose activities Congress did not intend to regulate on the theory that they posed no national concern." 715 F.2d at
1192-93 (quoting Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d at 363).

